Kick Out the Sports!
by Bob Cook
Bob Cook's weekly ruminations on sports appear Mondays in Flak.
Like the losing party on election night, devotees of the "Moneyball" style of baseball are scratching their heads over why it appears their side isn't winning even though, on paper, it appears to be far superior.
"Moneyball" refers to the 2003 book of that name by Michael Lewis, who followed the low-budget Oakland Athletics during the 2002 season to see how they could be a playoff contender year after year despite one of the lowest payrolls in baseball. The secret was that Oakland, and its general manager Billy Beane, studied and formulated statistics to determine what were the most successful predictors of winning, and which of those predictors was most undervalued by the market, as measured by players' salaries.
The pro-"Moneyball" crowd crowed when the Boston Red Sox and its sabermetric-friendly front office won the 2004 World Series. "Sabermetrics," the study and interpretation of baseball statistics, was coined by original stathead Bill James, who was on the Boston payroll at the time of the World Series title.
But now the pro-"Moneyball" crowd is having heart palpitations over two recent events: the Chicago White Sox winning the World Series and the Los Angeles Dodgers firing general manager Paul DePodesta. Both the White Sox and DePodesta play major roles in "Moneyball."
The White Sox are represented by general manager Kenny Williams, who, not to put too fine a point to it, is portrayed in "Moneyball" as Beane's bitch, trading valuable players to Oakland (and others) while somehow not realizing how valuable they are.
If that weren't bad enough, Williams' White Sox won the World Series this year with a strategy that included use of the sacrifice bunt and the stolen base, two plays that statheads will tell you, with convincing evidence, result in fewer runs than if a team just let its players swing away and wait for the next batter to move them over.
Meanwhile, DePodesta, in "Moneyball," appeared prominently as Spock to Beane's Captain Kirk, the No. 2 to his Austin Powers, the Rove to his Bush. He was the young, Harvard-educated stat hound whose computer, like HAL with the astronauts in 2001: A Space Odyssey, wiped out a squadron of scouts who would interfere with its mission. The scouts relied on what they saw with their eyes, radar guns and stopwatches, and dreamed of what players could be. DePodesta's computer looked at the numbers to show what actually was. (A key part of the book is that Beane was loved by scouts as a high school player, then flamed out in the major leagues.)
Oakland's success led to DePodesta's being hired in 2004 as general manager for the Los Angeles Dodgers. DePodesta is among a slew of mostly twenty- and thirtysomething, statistically minded general managers hired in recent years: Theo Epstein by the Boston Red Sox (after Beane had turned them down and it should be noted that Epstein resigned this week); Beane's old bean J.P. Ricciardi by the Toronto Blue Jays; Jon Daniels by the Texas Rangers; and Josh Byrnes (Epstein's assistant GM) by the Arizona Diamondbacks. Daniels and Byrne were each hired in the last few weeks.
Alas, DePodesta has become the first of that group to get canned. Some might argue that, with only two years on the job, DePodesta didn't get a chance, particularly in light of injuries to several key players this season. But when you go from the playoffs in your first year to 71-91 in your second, often chances aren't forthcoming. The short verdict on DePodesta was that he was good with a computer, but he wasn't so good on actual human interaction.
On the surface, each event the White Sox title and DePodesta's firing seems to represent the old ways of baseball winning out over the new. Of course, that isn't the case, given the hedge, "on the surface." But neither does it mean "Moneyball" hasn't been given a fair shake. What it means is that statistics are great, but the human element can never be forgotten. If the anti-"Moneyball" crowd puts too much faith in the human element, the fundamental flaw of a "Moneyball" acolyte is not putting enough faith in it.
The concept at the core of "Moneyball" is not statistical acronyms such as VORP and OPS, but finding players whom the marketplace undervalues. Williams did that with the White Sox by signing players who weren't over the hill, but had worn out their welcomes elsewhere and therefore would be available for bargain prices.
Meanwhile, if you have six or seven hot young GMs going for the same statistically valued kind of player, it gets harder to make deals and find undervalued players, because the market has driven up the price for what you want.
Also, the ability to work a computer does not automatically mean the ability to work as a manager. Many have made the point that Beane had served a years-long apprenticeship in the same organization, under a GM (Sandy Alderson) who already was moving in this direction before ascending to general manager. Selling your statistics is easy; managing the people who create those statistics is hard.
Every once in a while, the Democrats and the Republicans learn, through their ouster from power after holding it for many years, that party fundamentalism works for a little while, but if those on the fence aren't buying in, you'll be out. The "Moneyball" crowd is advised to learn this lesson before more White Sox and DePodestas occur.
E-mail Bob Cook at bobc@flakmag.com.