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The End of an ETA
by Sara J. Brenneis
There is a stark contrast between the
image
of three imposing figures dressed in black with the traditional black boina caps atop their white-hooded heads,
positioned amid ETA iconography and flags at a press conference table, and
the words spoken, in a digitally-altered female voice, by the central figure: "democratic process," "political options" and "permanent ceasefire."
This was the scene at the announcement of the end of ETA's 40 years of violence in Spain this week, and the dramatic contrasts extend beyond scary hooded beings espousing a move toward peaceful democracy. Established during
Francisco Franco's dictatorship, ETA — the Basque terrorist group whose cause is a separate and autonomous Basqueland — has long operated a campaign of fear in Spain, killing over 800 people since its founding. Reaction to the ceasefire has been mixed: Spain's Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodriquez Zapatero is exercising cautious optimism. The leader of the opposition party, Mariano Rajoy, has declared that nothing less than the dissolution of ETA will satisfy the country. A Spanish woman who told me, "Sure, I'm glad; but they've broken these promises before," echoes the hope tinged with doubt of most Spaniards. The question is: what does this ceasefire have that previous ones didn't, and can it last?
Little over two years ago, the March 11, 2004 attack on Madrid's Atocha train station gave Spain a membership card in the Victims of International Terrorism Club. Then-Prime Minister José Marķa Aznar, of the center-right Popular Party, immediately blamed ETA for the attacks. Popular reaction, though, held that this kind of massive bombing, in which almost 200 people died and ten times as many were injured, could not possibly be the work of the Basque separatists. ETA tends to operate on a much smaller scale, target primarily politicians and police rather than civilians, and publicly warn the authorities about upcoming attacks.
After years of angry and vocal demonstrations against ETA, millions of Spaniards once again took to the streets in cities across Spain. This time, however, many observed silent protests, answering violence with the refusal to acknowledge it, much as the Spanish press had done throughout ETA's tenure by refusing to publicize and glorify their attacks with front-page headlines. In the sea of protesters, word spread via text messages sent from friends abroad: despite Aznar's continued insistence, the Atocha attack did not bear ETA's signature. The mantra Pásalo (Pass it on) wound
its way through the crowds and this grassroots movement essentially resulted in Aznar's defeat in the national elections three days after the attack. For many, Aznar was faulted for misleading the Spanish public. Zapatero was elected
on a promise to end the Popular Party's corruption and lies, and on an equally strong commitment to ending ETA's terrorism.
The Atocha attacks were eventually attributed to Islamic militants whose affiliation with Al Qaeda is still in doubt, but in the process, ETA was promoted to a Global Terrorist Threat instead of a localized fringe group. Previous ceasefires in 1988 and 1998-1999 had failed, but after the Atocha attacks ETA toned down their tactics, continuing to bomb cars and buildings, but not killing anyone. A sea change in the conception of terrorism after Sept. 11 had finally found its way to Spain: ETA was branded terrorist group non grata by Bush himself and central figures in the organization were captured.
What brought about this latest ceasefire is basically terrorist peer pressure. Despite a growing tide of anti-ETA sentiment in Spain, the Basque group was still considered a local threat throughout the 1990s. Once global terrorism hit Spain in the form of the Atocha attacks, whatever quaint Spanishness ETA enjoyed eroded, and their decision to call a ceasefire now is essentially an
admission that terrorism isn't cute anymore. ETA has no interest in affiliating itself with Al Qaeda; their model is the IRA. And once the IRA negotiated a ceasefire, ETA was backed into a corner, trying to keep up with the Joneses.
Zapatero has been central not only to the altered conception of terrorism in Spain — as a global Mega Wal-Mart-sized issue rather than a local bodega-sized problem — but to the buildup to the ETA ceasefire itself. Should it succeed — and ETA's overwhelming unpopularity and current state of disarray makes this a very possible outcome — the ceasefire would solidify Zapatero's place in Spanish lore. Indeed, the defeat of ETA is a cause célèbre of both the right and the left in Spain and its defeat would be monumental. Still, Zapatero will also have to straddle the line between negotiating with ETA's demands for a democratic means of achieving a Basque state and sending the message that Spain's central government is nobody's bitch.
Zapatero eagerly embodies an anti-Bush approach in his willingness to find a
peaceable solution while still espousing the "either you're with us or you're with the terrorists" attitude, but his methods are highly controversial even in the land of flan and flamenco, where 90 percent of the population demanded that Spain pull its troops out of Iraq in 2004. Should the ceasefire fail — which would not come as a complete surprise based on past experience — Zapatero's legacy would be deflated and Spain's continued presence on the post-Sept. 11 target list would undoubtedly bolster Bush's guns-ablazin' approach.
While the outcome of ETA's latest ceasefire may appear to affect only Señor and Señora Español, Spain's actions could in fact set the stage for — or completely eliminate — future attempts at conflict resolution between terrorist groups and the folks they terrorize. As ETA has learned, barrio terrorist gangs are getting the cold shoulder in the post-Sept. 11 neighborhood.
Is there any chance that what happens in Spain in the coming months will encourage Bush and his cronies to learn a thing or two about
homeland security strategy? Buena suerte.
E-mail Sara J. Brenneis at sara at flakmag dot com.
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