Flak Magazine: Review of America Unbound, 2.24.04

Of all the initiatives President Bush undertook in his first term, his drastic changes to US foreign policy are likely to have the most long-term and far-reaching effects. From the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to backing out of the International Criminal Court and Kyoto Protocol, Bush already has arguably done as much to alter the course of America's relations with its neighbors as any of his predecessors. Not surprisingly, while many of Bush's other policies, such as his tax cuts and overhaul of Medicare, have been highly controversial, his foreign policy has drawn the broadest and harshest criticism both domestically and internationally. While agreeing with much of this criticism, authors Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay attempt to dispel some of the assumptions made by many other Bush critics. In "America Unbound," they explain the development of Bush's foreign policy, beginning with the formation of his team of aides and through the events of his presidency thus far.

It is increasingly popular to argue that Bush is not in control of America's foreign policy, which holders of this opinion say is instead run by a cadre of neoconservative officials in the administration. The president, meanwhile, is merely a figurehead, taking orders from those around him. Daalder and Lindsay, however, see a very different president, one who is in charge of his own administration and beholden to no one. They point out that, in fact, many of Bush's top aides are not associated with neoconservatism, including most notably Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The authors also argue that, with Bush's presidential campaign, the public and the media have focused too much on Bush's gaffes and mis-statements — Is it Slovenia or Slovakia? Greeks or Grecians? — all of which led many to underestimate the president. The authors see Bush as a man with firm beliefs and the ability to take advice from those around him without letting them tell him what to do. If nothing else, Bush is a man willing and able to make decisions for himself.

If true, this argument is in many ways reassuring. While Bush may be able to take personal credit for foreign policy successes, he also becomes the focus of blame for failures. And Daalder and Lindsay are quick to point out what they perceive as some of the administration's key failures thus far. While they agree with the majority of commentators regarding the need for and the general success of the war in Afghanistan, they offer interesting insights on key errors in judgment made during the operation. The most important of these errors, they say, was the operation at Tora-Bora, where US intelligence had learned that about 2,000 Al Qaeda members were hiding, most likely including Osama bin Laden. Yet local Afghan militias were sent in to find the fighters, with US Special Forces directing airstrikes from afar. The operation turned out to be largely ineffective, with the majority of Al Qaeda escaping, including bin Laden and his deputies. The authors attribute this to the failure to send in US troops, largely for fear of American casualties. The local forces, they argue, did not have the same incentives as the Americans and many of them were bribed. As a result, what could have been a major victory in the war on terrorism turned into, at best, a learning experience.

Yet the biggest failure so far of the Bush foreign policy, according to Daalder and Lindsay, was its inability to secure broad international support for the war in Iraq. This problem was rooted, they argue, partly in the administration's resolve to go to war regardless of whether it succeeded in gaining approval abroad. They point out that certain high-level officials, most prominently Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfwoitz, argued for the invasion of Iraq immediately following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (drawing a response from Bush that "Iraq, we keep for another day.") When the administration decided, primarily at the urging of Secretary of State Colin Powell, to seek UN approval, its resolve to go to war anyway quickly became apparent. The authors point out that in August 2002 Vice President Dick Cheney gave a major policy speech arguing that sending nuclear inspectors back to Iraq would "provide no assurance whatsoever of [Saddam's] compliance," clearly contradicting a decision taken by the president's top advisors just days earlier. As a result of this and other diplomatic blunders, when the Security Council passed Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors — or else — the authors point out that, "Many believed that Washington regarded the resolution as a prelude to war rather than as a possible alternative to it." The authors concede that it would have been difficult to secure UN support for the war, but their analysis is insightful in that it suggests that Bush's tactics certainly did little to help the cause: "It is here that diplomacy failed most spectacularly."

Unfortunately, although Daalder and Lindsay's book contains several such interesting comments, it is wanting for a more thorough discussion of where Bush's foreign policy "revolution" might take the country. Largely, that seems to be the result of trying to do much in too little space. In fact, the authors' premise is that Bush has drastically altered U.S. foreign policy, and yet they attempt to address everything from the formation of Bush's ideology to the Sept. 11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — all in just 200 pages. The result is a thorough discussion of these complex events, with a smattering of helpful insights, but lacking the analysis of their significance that one would expect from such experienced commentators.

— Yonatan Lupu (ylupu@comcast.net)